As such, they may contain many flaws and vulnerabilities that could allow an adversary to severely disrupt a target. An attacker attempts to invoke all common switches and options in the target application for the purpose of discovering weaknesses in the target.
For example, in some applications, adding a --debug switch causes debugging information to be displayed, which can sometimes reveal sensitive processing or configuration information to an attacker.
This attack differs from other forms of API abuse in that the attacker is indiscriminately attempting to invoke options in the hope that one of them will work rather than specifically targeting a known option. Nonetheless, even if the attacker is familiar with the published options of a targeted application this attack method may still be fruitful as it might discover unpublicized functionality.
Some APIs support scripting instructions as arguments. Methods that take scripted instructions or references to scripted instructions can be very flexible and powerful.
However, if an attacker can specify the script that serves as input to these methods they can gain access to a great deal of functionality. If the content provider is malicious, these scripts can compromise the client application. Some applications may even execute the scripts under their own identity rather than the identity of the user providing the script which can allow attackers to perform activities that would otherwise be denied to them.
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If these interfaces fail to authenticate requests the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for. An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash.
This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target. An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service.
These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth.
Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect. An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side.
These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection.
When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users. An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it.
The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server.
By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack. An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one.
The main weakness in XDoS is that the service provider generally must inspect, parse, and validate the XML messages to determine routing, workflow, security considerations, and so on.
It is exactly these inspection, parsing, and validation routines that XDoS targets. This attack exploits the loosely coupled nature of web services, where the service provider has little to no control over the service requester and any messages the service requester sends. An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target.
Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
This attack must be carried out within close proximity to a Bluetooth enabled device. An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request s.
Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request. Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format e. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed.
Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization. An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output.
However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory. An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution.
CAPEC is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.
By supplying oversized payloads in input vectors that will be processed by the parser, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization, and potentially cause execution of arbitrary code. An adversary's goal is to leverage parser failure to their advantage. An adversary creates a serialized data file e. Because serialized data parsers may not validate documents with external references, there may be no checks on the nature of the reference in the external data.
This can allow an adversary to open arbitrary files or connections, which may further lead to the adversary gaining access to information on the system that they would normally be unable to obtain. This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers e. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm.
The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific. An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression Regex implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size.
This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton NFA state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions. The algorithm builds a finite state machine and based on the input transitions through all the states until the end of the input is reached. NFA engines may evaluate each character in the input string multiple times during the backtracking. The algorithm tries each path through the NFA one by one until a match is found; the malicious input is crafted so every path is tried which results in a failure.
Exploitation of the Regex results in programs hanging or taking a very long time to complete. These attacks may target various layers of the Internet due to regular expressions being used in validation. An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication.
By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser.
The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,, elements and a couple of array elements.
This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service. An attacker may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules. The attacker attempts to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered. This behavior defeats some IPS and firewall filters who typically check the FLAGS in the header of the first packet since dropping this packet prevents the following fragments from being processed and assembled.
Another variation is overlapping fragments thus that an innocuous first segment passes the filter and the second segment overwrites the TCP header data with the true payload which is malicious in nature. The malicious payload manipulated properly may lead to a DoS due to resource consumption or kernel crash. Additionally the fragmentation could be used in conjunction with sending fragments at a rate slightly slower than the timeout to cause a DoS condition by forcing resources that assemble the packet to wait an inordinate amount of time to complete the task.
The fragmentation identification numbers could also be duplicated very easily as there are only 16 bits in IPv4 so only packets are needed.
An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets.
Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.
An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.
An adversary utilizes a resource leak on the target to deplete the quantity of the resource available to service legitimate requests. Resource leaks most often come in the form of memory leaks where memory is allocated but never released after it has served its purpose, however, theoretically, any other resource that can be reserved can be targeted if the target fails to release the reservation when the reserved resource block is no longer needed.
In this attack, the adversary determines what activity results in leaked resources and then triggers that activity on the target. Since some leaks may be small, this may require a large number of requests by the adversary. However, this attack differs from a flooding attack in that the rate of requests is generally not significant.
This is because the lost resources due to the leak accumulate until the target is reset, usually by restarting it. Thus, a resource-poor adversary who would be unable to flood the target can still utilize this attack. Resource depletion through leak differs from resource depletion through allocation in that, in the former, the adversary may not be able to control the size of each leaked allocation, but instead allows the leak to accumulate until it is large enough to affect the target's performance.
When depleting resources through allocation, the allocated resource may eventually be released by the target so the attack relies on making sure that the allocation size itself is prohibitive of normal operations by the target. An adversary leverages a legitimate capability of an application in such a way as to achieve a negative technical impact.
The system functionality is not altered or modified but used in a way that was not intended. This is often accomplished through the overuse of a specific functionality or by leveraging functionality with design flaws that enables the adversary to gain access to unauthorized, sensitive data. An attacker gets the victim to visit their malicious page that contains a script tag whose source points to the vulnerable system with a URL that requests a response from the server containing a JSON object with possibly confidential information.
The malicious page also contains malicious code to capture the JSON object returned by the server before any other processing on it can take place, typically by overriding the JavaScript function used to create new objects. This hook allows the malicious code to get access to the creation of each object and transmit the possibly sensitive contents of the captured JSON object to the attackers' server. There is nothing in the browser's security model to prevent the attackers' malicious JavaScript code originating from attacker's domain to set up an environment as described above to intercept a JSON object response coming from the vulnerable target system's domain , read its contents and transmit to the attackers' controlled site.
An attacker leverages the security functionality of the system aimed at thwarting potential attacks to launch a denial of service attack against a legitimate system user. Many systems, for instance, implement a password throttling mechanism that locks an account after a certain number of incorrect log in attempts. An attacker can leverage this throttling mechanism to lock a legitimate user out of their own account. The weakness that is being leveraged by an attacker is the very security feature that has been put in place to counteract attacks.
This attack relies on client side code to access local files and resources instead of URLs. When the client browser is expecting a URL string, but instead receives a request for a local file, that execution is likely to occur in the browser process space with the browser's authority to local files. The attacker can send the results of this request to the local files out to a site that they control. This attack may be used to steal sensitive authentication data either local or remote , or to gain system profile information to launch further attacks.
An attacker may take advantage of the application feature to help users recover their forgotten passwords in order to gain access into the system with the same privileges as the original user. Generally password recovery schemes tend to be weak and insecure. Most of them use only one security question. For instance, mother's maiden name tends to be a fairly popular one.
Unfortunately in many cases this information is not very hard to find, especially if the attacker knows the legitimate user. These generic security questions are also re-used across many applications, thus making them even more insecure. An attacker could for instance overhear a coworker talking to a bank representative at the work place and supplying their mother's maiden name for verification purposes.
An attacker can then try to log in into one of the victim's accounts, click on "forgot password" and there is a good chance that the security question there will be to provide mother's maiden name. A weak password recovery scheme totally undermines the effectiveness of a strong password scheme. An attacker forces the encryption level to be lowered, thus enabling a successful attack against the encrypted data.
An attacker, with control of a Cellular Rogue Base Station or through cooperation with a Malicious Mobile Network Operator can force the mobile device e. An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed over via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client.
This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. An adversary takes advantage of incorrectly configured SSL communications that enables access to data intended to be encrypted. Parameter provided templates are disabled by default, but can be enabled by setting params. Defining a response writer requires configuration API access. Mitigation: Ensure your network settings are configured so that only trusted traffic communicates with Solr, especially to the configuration APIs.
Description: The 8. If you use the default solr. If this port is opened for inbound traffic in your firewall, then anyone with network access to your Solr nodes will be able to access JMX, which may in turn allow them to upload malicious code for execution on the Solr server.
The vulnerability is already public [1] and mitigation steps were announced on project mailing lists and news page [3] on August 14th, without mentioning RCE at that time.
Mitigation: Make sure your effective solr. Note that the effective solr. You can then validate that the 'com. Remember to follow the Solr Documentation's advice to never expose Solr nodes directly in a hostile network environment. Description: Solr versions prior to 5. Description: The DataImportHandler, an optional but popular module to pull in data from databases and other sources, has a feature in which the whole DIH configuration can come from a request's "dataConfig" parameter.
Since a DIH config can contain scripts, this parameter is a security risk. Starting with version 8. Its major features include powerful full-text search, hit highlighting, faceted search, dynamic clustering, database integration, rich document e. This leads to waste of resources on both-sides and long GC-pause.
Nested documents AKA child documents or block join is significantly improved. Most improvements come from storing and leveraging more information about the relationships in the index, like the named relationship between a child and its parent. This information is used by the [child] doc transformer to return children in nested form instead of flat. There is plenty more that can be done with this in the future.
Another key improvement is that nested documents can be deleted or replaced in a natural way without orphaning child documents; although care is still needed with delete-by-query. Being a major release, Solr 8 removes many deprecated APIs, changes various parameter defaults and behavior. Some changes may require a re-index of your content. You are thus encouraged to thoroughly read the "Upgrade Notes" at:. By pointing it to a malicious RMI server, an attacker could take advantage of Solr's unsafe deserialization to trigger remote code execution on the Solr side.
Solr 7. Bugfix: Autoscaling based replica placement was broken out of the box. Due to these reasons, this issue reverts the default replica placement policy to the 'legacy' assignment policy that was the default until Solr 7. Description: The "shards" parameter does not have a corresponding whitelist mechanism, so it can request any URL.
Mitigation: Upgrade to Apache Solr 7. Furthermore, this release includes Apache Lucene 7. Description: The details of this vulnerability were reported to the Apache Security mailing list.
See [1] for more details. Mitigation: Users are advised to upgrade to either Solr 6. Once upgrade is complete, no other steps are required. Those releases disable external entities in anonymous XML files passed through this request parameter. If users are unable to upgrade to Solr 6. Alternatively, if Solr instances are only used locally without access to public internet, the vulnerability cannot be used directly, so it may not be required to update, and instead reverse proxies or Solr client applications should be guarded to not allow end users to inject dataConfig request parameters.
Please refer to [2] on how to correctly secure Solr servers. The Apache Solr Reference Guide for 7. Description: Apache Solr uses Apache Tika for parsing binary file types such as doc, xls, pdf etc.
A malicious user could inject arbitrary code into a MATLAB file that would be executed when the object is deserialized. Mitigation: Users are advised to upgrade to either Solr 5. Solr 5. RunExecutableListener has been disabled by default can be enabled by -Dsolr.
Furthermore, this release includes Apache Lucene 5. Fix for a bug where Solr was attempting to load the same core twice Error message: "Lock held by this virtual machine". Description: The details of this vulnerability were reported on public mailing lists. It can also be used as Blind XXE using ftp wrapper in order to read arbitrary local files from the solr server. The caller may re-load an unloaded sheet by calling Book. This is the only case where an exception will be raised.
The caller may query the state of a sheet using Book. Once resources are released, no further sheets can be loaded. When using on-demand, it is advisable to ensure that Book. This can be done by calling Book. The Book object is also a context manager, so you can wrap your code in a with statement that will make sure underlying resources are closed.
If your code ingests. A good summary of vulnerabilities you should worry can be found here: XML vulnerabilities. For clarity, xlrd will try and import ElementTree from the following sources.
The list is in priority order, with those earlier in the list being preferred to those later in the list:. To guard against these problems, you should consider the defusedxml project which can be used as follows:. An instance of the Book class. You should not instantiate this class yourself. Latest is 8.
Earliest supported by this module: 2. For earlier versions, this is used to derive the appropriate Python encoding to be used to convert to Unicode. Example: 1, 61 meaning USA, Australia. This information may give a clue to the correct encoding for an unknown codepage. For a long list of observed values, refer to the OpenOffice. If you are creating an output file using for example xlwt , use this list. All sheets not already loaded will be loaded. Returns: A Sheet. This information is available even when no sheets have yet been loaded.
New in version 0. Colour indexes into the palette map into red, green, blue tuples. References: OOo docs s6.
If the named stream is not found, None, 0, 0 will be returned. For pictures of the line styles, refer to OOo docs s3. In the latter case, cell XFs have had the above inheritance mechanism applied. It is not an index in the Python sense. It is a key to a map. It is true only for Excel 4. The coords attribute is a tuple of the form:. The caller will need to decide how to handle this situation.
The components of the coords attribute are also available as individual attributes: shtxlo , shtxhi , rowxlo , rowxhi , colxlo , and colxhi. The relflags attribute is a 6-tuple of flags which indicate whether the corresponding sheet row col lo hi is relative 1 or absolute 0. There is necessarily no information available as to what cell s the reference could possibly be relative to. The caller must decide what if any use to make of oREL operands.
In the cell access functions, rowx is a row index, counting from zero, and colx is a column index, counting from zero. For information about cell types and cell values, refer to the documentation of the Cell class. You access Sheet objects via the Book object that was returned when you called xlrd. A row index is in range thesheet.
It is one more than the maximum column index found, ignoring trailing empty cells. From the OOo docs:. For the default hierarchy, refer to the Colinfo class.
The upper limits are exclusive: i. Breaks are tuples in the form index of row after break, start col index, end col index.
Refer to the documentation of the Cell class. No cases of this have been seen in the wild. It seems impossible to create one in the Excel UI. The docs on the GCW record say this:.
Reference to the source may be useful: see Sheet. When using this function to interpret the contents of a workbook, you should pass in the datemode attribute of that workbook.
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MHK Moldflow Corp. MOD Pizza is a business, but our real purpose is creating positive social impact in the lives of our employees and their communities. This piece will include everything from mods to tweak your Sims personality to mods that will add more content. RogueTech Public. Author: The Odd Little Turtle. Date: December 18, That is to say, feature and content complete for the Early Access build. The CSC file on Samsung contains essential information such as-. If you want Odin to wipe all third-party apps, data, and settings and perform a factory reset while installing the firmware, you should add the CSC binary to Odin.
When your Samsung phone or Galaxy Tab boots up, your device will be in the same state on software level as it was when you purchased it. The image, video, audio, and all other files present on the internal storage will be deleted. Flashing the CSC binary will result in a clean installation.
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